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Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations
Anthony G. Greenwaldt
Linda Hamilton Kriegertt
The assumption that human behavior is largely under conscious con-
trol has taken a theoretical battering in recent years. Although this assault
in some ways resembles the previous century's Freudian revolution, there
are important differences between the two. Freud's views of unconscious
mechanisms were embedded in a theory that never achieved conclusive
support among scientists, despite many empirical theory-testing efforts in
the middle third of the twentieth century.' Consequently, most psycholo-
gists have abandoned Freud's psychoanalytic theory of unconscious mental
processes.
Theoretical conceptions of conscious control over human behavior
were strongly re-established in the last third of the twentieth century, but
the dominance of such views has been crumbling during the past two dec-
ades. Unlike the Freudian revolution, however, the new science of
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unconscious mental process is not the product of a single brilliant theoreti-
cal mind. Rather, it is being constructed from an evolving, accumulating
body of reproducible research findings.2
This Article introduces implicit bias-an aspect of the new science of
unconscious mental processes that has substantial bearing on discrimina-
tion law. Theories of implicit bias contrast with the "nafve" psychological
conception of social behavior,3 which views human actors as being guided
solely by their explicit beliefs and their conscious intentions to act. A belief
is explicit if it is consciously endorsed. An intention to act is conscious if
the actor is aware of taking an action for a particular reason. Of course,
actors may dissemble and deny they are taking an action for a particular
reason, so conscious intentions based on explicit beliefs may be hard to
verify. But a deceitful actor is nevertheless capable of asserting the belief
or identifying the intention that provides the basis for action, even when
unwilling to do so. 4 In contrast, the science of implicit cognition suggests
that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control over the proc-
esses of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that moti-
vate their actions.
2. The early stages of this modem revolution are reviewed by Greenwald, supra note 1. Nisbett
and Wilson's expos6 of the inadequacies of introspective explanations of behavior was a noticeable
starting point of the modem revolution, leading to widespread understanding that the self-report
measures of conscious mental process that were widely used in psychological research were highly
suspect. See Richard. E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977). Wegner's and Bargh's
more recent works reveal the frequency with which seemingly ordinary voluntary actions are controlled
in ways that evade conscious scrutiny, further undermining the idea that a conscious mind is the
effective governor of most human behavior. See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF
CONSCIOUS WILL (2002); John A. Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and
Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1014 (2001).
3. "Naive psychology" refers to laypersons' intuitions about determinants and consequences of
human thought and behavior, especially their own. Modem treatments were largely inspired by Fritz
Heider's book, The Psychology ofInterpersonal Relations, which initiated systematic investigation of
how laypersons' intuitions differ from scientific understanding. FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958).
4. Methodological investigations by social psychologists in the 1960s revealed social influences
operating within research and interview settings that would lead people to describe their explicit beliefs
inaccurately in experimental studies. See Martin T. Ome, On the Social Psychology of the
Psychological Experiment: With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their
Implications, 17 AM. PSYCHOL. 776 (1962); Milton J. Rosenberg, The Conditions and Consequences of
Evaluation Apprehension, in ARTIFACT IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 279 (Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L.
Rosnow eds., 1969); Stephen J. Weber & Thomas D. Cook, Subject Effects in Laboratory Research: An
Examination of Subject Roles. Demand Characteristics, and Valid Inference, 77 PSYCHOL. BULL. 273
(1972). Work inspired by Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory initiated modem interest in
understanding people's inability to identify the causes of their own thought and behavior. See LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). Nisbett and Wilson's article summarizes
the humbling implications of the ensuing two decades of research. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 2.
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I
IMPLICIT COGNITION
Many mental processes function implicitly, or outside conscious at-
tentional focus.' These processes include implicit memory,6 implicit per-
ception,' implicit attitudes,8 implicit stereotypes,' implicit self-esteem, °
and implicit self-concept." The meaning of implicit in these phrases is
technical, but still reasonably close to its everyday meaning. For example,
research on "implicit memory" demonstrates that even when a person can-
not voluntarily ("explicitly") retrieve a memory, that person's behavior
may reveal that some previous experience has left a memory record. In
such situations, the memory is said to be expressed implicitly, and not ex-
plicitly, in the behavior. For example, on the first day of one implicit-
memory experiment, 2 subjects were asked to pronounce each of a long list
of people's names. Some of these names were recognizably famous, while
others were not. On Day Two, these same subjects judged whether each
name on another long list was famous or not. Half of Day Two's non-
famous names were repeated from Day One. The result: On Day Two,
more of the repeated non-famous names than the novel ones were judged
famous. These "false fame" judgments comprise an implicit-memory ef-
fect. The names acquired some familiarity from Day One's attended-but-
not-studied pronunciation even though, by Day Two, the subject often did
not consciously remember the initial exposure on Day One. This perhaps
vague feeling of familiarity for repeated names was sometimes misattrib-
uted to fame, leading to greater false judgments of fame for the repeated
than the non-repeated names. Subjects presumably go through a mental
5. For an overview of implicit social cognition, which encompasses the phenomena of implicit
attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995); see
also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and
Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL. REV 3 (2002).
6. See Daniel L. Schacter, Implicit Memory: History and Current Status, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 501 (1987); Larry L. Jacoby & Mark Dallas, On the
Relationship Between Autobiographical Memory and Perceptual Learning, 110 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL: GENERAL 306 (1981).
7. See John F. Kihlstrom et al., Implicit Perception, in PERCEPTION WITHOUT
AWARENESS: COGNITIVE, CLINICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 17 (Robert F. Bornstein & Thane S.
Pittman eds., 1992).
8. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 1464 (1998).
9. See Laurie A. Rudman et al., Implicit Self-Concept and Evaluative Implicit Gender
Stereotypes: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1164
(2001).
10. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test to
Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 1022 (2000).
11. See Rudman et al., supra note 9.
12. See Larry L. Jacoby et al., Becoming Famous Overnight: Limits on the Ability to Avoid
Unconscious Influences of the Past, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 326 (1989).
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process resembling the following: "This name seems familiar. Why is it
familiar? Perhaps it's famous." For names that subjects explicitly remem-
bered seeing and pronouncing on Day One, subjects correctly understood
why the name seemed familiar. Therefore they did not mistakenly attribute
the familiarity to fame.
II
IMPLICIT ATTITUDES AND IMPLICIT STEREOTYPES
Implicit-memory research conducted in the 1980s led researchers to
develop measures of other implicit mental phenomena. Two of these-
implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes-are especially relevant to bias
and discrimination.
A. Implicit Attitudes
Social psychologists define an attitude as an evaluative disposition-
that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably
toward, someone or something. Explicit expressions of attitudes occur fre-
quently, whenever we say we like or dislike someone or something. A
statement that one likes a particular presidential candidate provides a ready
example. Attitudes can also be expressed through favorable or unfavorable
action, such as by voting for or against a particular presidential candidate.
If the voter understands that the favorable vote results from favorable be-
liefs about the candidate, the vote is an explicit attitude expression.
In other situations, a vote might function as an implicit attitude indica-
tor-that is, an action that indicates favor or disfavor toward some object
but is not understood by the actor as expressing that attitude. 3 For exam-
ple, a voter may vote for a particular candidate even though the voter
knows nothing other than the candidate's name. One of the things that
might influence a voter to vote for this candidate is that the candidate's
name shares one or more initial letters with the voter's name. In such a
case, the vote can be understood, at least in part, as an implicit expression
of the voter's self-favorable attitude. 4
As an additional, hypothetical example, consider how people form
impressions of a liked or disliked candidate's spouse, child, or sibling.
Someone who knows nothing about the candidate's relative other than the
relative's relation to the candidate may find that they like or dislike the
relative. Not surprisingly, this attitude toward the relative is likely to match
the attitude toward the candidate. Evaluation of the unknown relative may
therefore be regarded as an implicit indicator of attitude toward the
13. Greenwald and Banaji define implicit attitudes as "introspectively unidentified (or
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought,
or action toward social objects." Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 5, at 8.
14. See id. at 12.
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candidate. Here, the "implicit" designation indicates that the attitude ex-
pressed toward the candidate determined the attitude toward the relative,
even though the liking or disliking for the relative may be experienced as
an independent attitude.
Implicit attitudes are of greatest interest when implicit and explicit
attitudes toward the same object differ. These discrepancies are referred to
as dissociations between implicit and explicit attitudes. Dissociations are
commonly observed in attitudes toward stigmatized groups, including
groups defined by race, age, ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation.
Researchers have used the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a procedure
described below, to reveal such attitudinal dissociations. 5
B. Implicit Stereotypes
A social stereotype is a mental association between a social group or
category and a trait. The association may reflect a statistical reality, but it
need not. If the association does reflect a statistical reality, members of the
group will be more likely to display the trait than will members of other
groups. A perfect or near-perfect correlation, which might be a defining
trait-such as physical stamina for basketball players-is of little psycho-
logical interest and is often not even considered part of a stereotype. It is of
greater psychological interest when the correlation between group mem-
bership and trait expression is much less than perfect, but the trait never-
theless distinguishes members of one group from others. Suppose,
hypothetically, that 10-15% of people over the age of seventy drive on
highways at speeds noticeably below speed limits, but that only 5% of
younger people drive this slowly. If these figures were accurate, they
would reflect a genuine association between age and driving behavior.
However, the stereotype would apply to only a small minority (10-15%) of
elderly people. Nonetheless, it may come to serve as a default assump-
tion-the assumption that any elderly person is likely to drive slowly.
The first experimental demonstration of implicit stereotypes made use
of the stereotype that associates male gender with fame-deserving
achievement.16 In this experiment, which was based on Jacoby et al.'s
false-fame implicit-memory effect described in Part I,"7 Banaji and
Greenwald found that the false-fame effect was substantial when the pro-
nounced (i.e., attended-but-not-studied) names were male, but was
15. See Wilhelm Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between the Implicit
Association Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1369
(2005) (discussing factors that promote dissociation of implicit from explicit attitudes); Brian A.
Nosek, Moderators of the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Evaluation, 134 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 565 (2005).
16. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1995).
17. See Jacoby et al., supra note 12.
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noticeably weaker when the names were female. Banaji and Greenwald
described this result as an implicit indicator of the stereotype that associ-
ates maleness with fame-deserving achievement. 8 Put more technically, an
implicit stereotype of this kind can be defined as "the introspectively uni-
dentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate
attributions of qualities to members of a social category."' 9
Stereotypes can involve associations of either favorable or unfavor-
able traits with a group. Because the favorable-unfavorable distinction is
also central to the concept of attitude, it is natural to ask how stereotypes
and attitudes differ. For stereotypes, the content of the ascribed trait, rather
than its evaluative valence, is central. For attitudes, the opposite holds. For
example, in the implicit-fame experiment, it was the trait of fame, rather
than the positivity of fame, that defined the implicit-stereotype phenome-
non.
III
RESPONSE BIAS AND IMPLICIT BIAS
The term "bias," sometimes referred to as "response bias," denotes a
displacement of people's responses along a continuum of possible judg-
ments. Response bias need not indicate something unwise, inappropriate,
or even inaccurate. For example, instructors may vary in their response
bias in grading, such that some assign a relatively high grade to average
student performance while others assign a lower grade to the same per-
formance. Instructors who differ in response bias on the grading dimension
may nevertheless be equally sensitive to differences among students. Con-
sider an instructor who is biased to grade leniently and assigns grades ex-
clusively between A (highest) and C (lowest). This instructor's grades may
be perfectly correlated with those of a severe-grading instructor who limits
grades to the B-to-D range. If these two instructors graded the same work,
each of the lenient instructor's grades would be exactly one letter grade
above those of the more severe instructor. Unless there are established
standards that associate specific performances with specific grades, one
could not accuse either instructor of being less "accurate" than the other.
A more widely recognized form of bias does affect response accuracy
and bears a pejorative connotation. Imagine a particular instructor who dif-
ferentially assigns grades to two identically performing students when one
student is male and the other is female, or when one is White and the other
is Black. In this case, the fairness and accuracy of judgments are both
compromised. Attitudes and stereotypes are plausible causes of such dis-
criminatory biases. If, among equally qualified job applicants, one favors
members of one race over those of another, this plausibly reflects an
18. Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 16, at 186-87.
19. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 5, at 15.
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attitudinal bias: one may have a more favorable attitude toward one race
group than toward the other. If, among equally qualified renters, one as-
sumes that members of one race will be more conscientious in paying rent
than those of another, this may be a bias rooted in stereotype. If, among
equally qualified candidates for a management position, men are consid-
ered preferable to women, it could be due to operation of a stereotype that
treats leadership as a trait more frequently found among men than
women.
20
Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or
implicit stereotypes. Implicit biases are especially intriguing, and also es-
pecially problematic, because they can produce behavior that diverges from
a person's avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles. The very existence of
implicit bias poses a challenge to legal theory and practice, because dis-
crimination doctrine is premised on the assumption that, barring insanity or
mental incompetence, human actors are guided by their avowed (explicit)
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.2'
Biases can be either favorable or unfavorable. Ingroup bias designates
favoritism toward groups to which one belongs. There is a widespread in-
tuition that it is often acceptable to be biased in favor of at least some of
the groups to which one belongs. In this view, bias is a problem only when
it is directed against some group. Thus it may be considered acceptable to
be biased in favor of one's siblings, children, schoolmates, and friends.
Interestingly, the intuition that biases in favor of one's smaller in-
groups (such as family and friends) are acceptable typically does not ex-
tend to believing that biases favoring one's larger ingroups (one's race,
sex, ethnicity, religion, or age group) are appropriate. Is there a boundary
encompassing ingroups toward which favorable biases can be considered
acceptable? The illegality of some kinds of biased behavior toward certain
groups (regardless of one's membership)-such as those defined by race,
sex, ethnicity, religion, and age-provides a non-psychological boundary.
Psychologically, the small size of some ingroups is no doubt significant
because many people feel more obliged to help others when they are one of
only a few people who can possibly be helpful,22 as may often be the case
for family members.
20. Discriminatory biases are plausibly stereotype-based when they oppose the bias that might be
expected as an attitude effect. For example, gender biases that discriminate against women are
plausibly stereotype-based, given that research has found that attitudes toward women are often more
favorable than attitudes toward men. See Alice H. Eagly & Antonio Mladinic, Gender Stereotypes and
Attitudes Toward Women and Men, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 543, 551-55 (1989).
21. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
22. This psychological truth was demonstrated very clearly by Darley and Latan6, who found that
a solitary witness to a simulated epileptic seizure was considerably more likely to intervene than was
one of a group of such witnesses. See John M. Darley & Bibb Latan6, Bystander Intervention in
Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968). The effect
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Perhaps fortunately, the situations in which people wish to be biased
in favor of their smaller, important ingroups-such as in providing care for
their own children-are often those for which no question of possible dis-
crimination against others arises. Nevertheless, a positive attitude toward
any ingroup necessarily implies a relative negativity toward a complemen-
tary outgroup. In some circumstances, this relative favoring of the ingroup
puts members of other groups at a discriminatory disadvantage, as when
one allows favoritism toward a family member or friend to influence a hir-
ing, job assignment, rental, or admissions decision.
IV
THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST
The recent development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has
accelerated research on implicit bias. The IAT's general method can be
adapted to measure a wide variety of the group-valence and group-trait as-
sociations that underlie attitudes and stereotypes. The IAT is an implicit
measure because it infers group-valence and group-trait associations from
performances that are influenced by those associations in a manner that is
not discerned by respondents.2 3
The most widely used IAT measure assesses implicit attitudes toward
African Americans (AA) relative to European Americans (EA).24 In this
"Race IAT," respondents first practice distinguishing AA from EA faces
by responding to faces from one of these two categories with the press of a
computer key on the left side of the keyboard and to those of the other
category with a key on the right side of the keyboard. Respondents next
practice distinguishing pleasant-meaning from unpleasant-meaning words
in a similar manner. The next two tasks, given in a randomly determined
order, use all four categories (AA faces, EA faces, pleasant-meaning
words, and unpleasant-meaning words). In one of these two tasks, the IAT
calls for one response (say, pressing a left-side key) when the respondent
sees AA faces or pleasant words, whereas EA faces and unpleasant words
call for the other response (right-side key). In the remaining task, EA faces
of being in a unique position to help is so strong that the presence of multiple bystanders can result in
less likelihood of any help being given than when only a single bystander is present. Id.
23. The IAT was first reported by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz in 1998. See Greenwald et
al., supra note 8. Although other implicit measures have been developed and have been used
extensively in research, see Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social
Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003), the IAT that has
been used most widely, and this Article focuses on it. The statement that respondents do not discern the
influence of associations on their IAT performance is properly limited to respondents who have not
become aware of the way in which the procedure assesses association strengths.
24. The Race IAT uses these formal race category labels, instead of -Black and White,-
because the color-name labels carry associative connotations of good and bad that are unrelated to race,
and these connotations might interfere with the measurement of race-valence associations.
[Vol. 94:945
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share a response with pleasant words and AA faces with unpleasant
words.25
The implicit-attitude measure produced by this IAT is based on rela-
tive speeds of responding in the two four-category tasks. This measure al-
lows an inference about attitudes (category-valence associations) because it
is easier to give the same response to items from two categories when those
two categories are cognitively associated with each other. For American
respondents taking the Race IAT, response speeds are often faster when
EA, rather than AA, is paired with pleasant words. 26 This frequently ob-
served pattern supports the interpretation that EA-pleasant is a stronger
association than AA-pleasant. Researchers have described this result as
showing implicit attitudinal preference for EA relative to AA.27
Research comparing IAT (implicit) measures with parallel survey-
type self-report (explicit) measures has found systematic variations in the
agreement between these two types of measures. There is substantially
greater agreement between the two types of measures when implicit and
explicit attitudes have been shaped by the same experiences, which is
likely to be the case for attitudes toward consumer brands, sports teams,
and political candidates. 28 When implicit and explicit measures of attitudes
or stereotypes disagree-for example, when a Race LAT shows preference
for EA and a self-report measure shows impartiality-there is said to exist
a dissociation between the two.
V
PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE IAT
Researchers have extended the IAT into increasingly diverse domains,
applying its general method to a wide variety of groups and social
25. Various nonessential aspects of the IAT procedure, such as the hand assigned to the pleasant
category and order of performing the two four-category tasks, are randomized or counterbalanced to
avoid their systematically influencing findings.
26. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration
Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 101, 105 (2002) (reporting findings
from a dataset with N = 192,364).
27. Because each task involves two associations, the complete description of this inference about
association strengths is that the combined strength of the EA-pleasant and AA-unpleasant associations
is stronger than the combined strength the of AA-pleasant and EA-unpleasant associations. This
association-strength interpretation of the IAT has been widely, although not universally, accepted. For a
recent discussion of alternative interpretations, see Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7 A Methodological and Conceptual Review,
in AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR (John A. Bargh ed., forthcoming
2006). We consider one of these alternative interpretations-that the IAT measures cultural beliefs-in
infra Part V.
28. See Hofmann et al., supra note 15; Nosek, supra note 15; Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003).
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categories.29 Perhaps because of the importance of attitude as a theoretical
construct in psychology, more attention, thus far, has been given to investi-
gating implicit attitudes than to investigating implicit stereotypes. In rec-
ognition of the importance of understanding relations between IAT
measures and behavior, many studies that have used an IAT attitude meas-
ure have also included a measure of one or more social behaviors that are
theoretically expected to be related to attitude or stereotype measures. The
examined behaviors have ranged widely, including (as just a few exam-
ples) voting for political candidates, measures of warmth and discomfort in
interracial interactions, and measures of brain activity when viewing im-
ages of members of a racial group. Analyses of the data then determine
whether individual differences in implicit attitudes or stereotypes measured
by the IAT correlate with (i.e., are predictive of) individual differences in
behavior.
A recent meta-analytic review by Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald,
and Banaji identified and summarized sixty-one such studies." This re-
view's method appraised the value of IAT measures by assessing the rele-
vant body of research in the aggregate, rather than as isolated research
findings. To do this, the researchers averaged the available correlational
measures of relations between IAT measures and behaviors of interest
within groups of studies that tested related hypotheses, as well as over the
entire group of eighty-six independent findings from the sixty-one studies.
For comparison, parallel analyses examined the aggregated correlations of
the same behavioral measures with self-report (explicit) measures, which
most of the studies had also obtained.
Both the implicit (IAT) and the parallel explicit measures displayed
predictive validity, meaning that both types of measures, on average, were
significantly correlated with measures of behavior, as expected. To be
clear, this does not mean that statistically significant correlations were
found in all studies, but that averages of the correlational results of the col-
lected similar tests clearly showed the expected relationships. Predictive
validity was greater (meaning that the average correlation was larger) for
self-report (explicit) measures than for IAT measures. However, within the
critical group of studies that focused on prejudicial attitudes and stereo-
types-in other words, within the studies of implicit bias-predictive va-
lidity was significantly greater for the IA T measures.
Importantly, implicit measures of bias have relatively greater predic-
tive validity than explicit measures in situations that are socially sensitive,
like racial interactions, where impression-management processes might
29. See Nosek, supra note 15.
30. See T. ANDREW POEHLMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND USING THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION
TEST: III. META-ANALYSIS OF PREDICTIVE VALIDITY (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
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inhibit people from expressing negative attitudes or unattractive stereo-
types. Additionally, implicit measures have relatively greater validity in
predicting spontaneous behaviors such as eye contact, seating distance, and
other such actions that communicate social warmth or discomfort.
VI
How PERVASIVE IS IMPLICIT BIAS?
Since 1998, IAT measures of implicit attitudes have been available on
the Internet for self-administered demonstration use.31 These web-
accessible demonstrations, which allow users to interactively experience
the IAT, have accumulated sufficient data to allow researchers to draw
conclusions about the pervasiveness of implicit and explicit biases.3"
Table 1 displays results for a dozen data sets, comparing the degree of
favoritism toward advantaged versus disadvantaged groups revealed by
implicit versus explicit measures. Two differences between the implicit and
explicit measures are readily apparent in these data. First, the explicit
measures generally show much greater evidence for attitudinal impartiality
or neutrality. Averaged across the dozen topics, 42% of respondents ex-
pressed exact or near-exact neutrality on explicit measures. On the IAT
measures, however, only 18% of respondents demonstrated sufficiently
small implicit bias to be judged implicitly neutral. Second, the IAT meas-
ures consistently revealed greater bias in favor of the relatively advantaged
group (averaging almost three-quarters of respondents across all the topics)
than did the explicit measures (for which an average of slightly over one-
third of respondents showed bias favoring advantaged groups).
Table 1 also shows a bias index, computed as the percentage of re-
spondents showing favorability to the advantaged group minus the percent-
age showing favorability to the disadvantaged group. Whereas this index
averaged only 20% for explicit measures, it averaged the very large value
of 64% for IAT measures. The broad generalization justified by the data in
Table 1 is that implicit attitude measures reveal far more bias favoring ad-
vantaged groups than do explicit measures.
It is important to note that these data came from voluntary visitors to
the IAT website-a self-selected sample, which is different from a repre-
sentative sample that can be obtained by selecting and recruiting respon-
dents randomly from a defined population. As a result, the data in Table 1
cannot be interpreted as representing the attitude distribution of some spe-
cific population of interest, such as adult residents of the United States.
31. Interactive demonstrations of more than a dozen versions of the IAT are available at
https://implicit.harvard.edu.
32. These demonstration tests were not set up to conduct research but were nevertheless obliged
to record data to enable computations of results that were reported to web visitors. The accumulated
data provided by the site's many visitors has proved to be a remarkably rich archive.
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Even so, the greater favoritism to advantaged groups found in IAT meas-
ures than in explicit measures would almost certainly be found with repre-
sentative samples. Strong evidence for this assertion comes from
examination of the Race IAT data for the wide-ranging demographic sub-
groups shown in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that, with one notable exception, the percentage of re-
spondents who display implicit race bias varies relatively little across
groups categorized by varied age, sex, and educational attainment. African
Americans constitute the only subgroup of respondents who do not show
substantial implicit pro-EA race bias on the Race IAT. Approximately
equal percentages of African Americans displayed implicit bias in the pro-
AA and pro-EA directions. Significantly, among African Americans, IAT
results showed considerably greater favoritism to the dominant European
American group than did the results from self-report measures, which
showed very strong favoritism toward African Americans. The results
shown in Table 2 strongly suggest that any non-African American sub-
group of the United States population will reveal high proportions of per-
sons showing statistically noticeable implicit race bias in favor of EA
relative to AA.
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Table 1. Distributions of Responding on Self-report (Explicit) and IAT (Implicit) Measures
% biased toward disadvantaged (dis) and advantaged (adv)
Disadvantaged Advantaged N groups, and % neutral (neu)
grp grp Self-report (Explicit) IAT (Implicit)
d I Neu I adv Iindex dis neu adv index
[AT Demonstration Web Site Tests
Aft. American Eur. Ameri- 22074 11.3% 54.6% 34.0% 23% 10.6% 24.1% 65.3% 55%
can
Old Young 11528 16.7% 36.8% 46.6% 30% 4.7% 14.3% 81.1% 76%
IAT Research Web Site Tests
Aft. American Eur. Ameri- 211 11.8% 56.4% 31.9% 20% 12.3% 18.5% 69.2% 57%
can
Asians Whites 211 16.4% 56.9% 26.7% 10% 11.3% 25.9% 62.8% 51%
Canadian American 218 24.1% 39.5% 36.4% 12% 13.3% 21.7% 65.0% 52%
Foreign places American 178 20.9% 36.6% 42.4% 22% 9.6% 14.0% 76.4% 67%places
Gay people Straight 217 14.3% 45.7% 40.0% 26% 8.3% 22.9% 68.8% 60%people
Muslims Jews 144 10.4% 49.3% 40.3% 30% 11.1% 20.7% 68.2% 57%
Old people Young 236 27.4% 39.2% 33.5% 6% 5.5% 15.6% 78.9% 73%
people
Poor Rich 211 36.7% 37.6% 25.7% -11% 1.4% 4.3% 94.3% 93%
Fat people Thin people 239 13.4% 42.4% 44.2% 31% 13.1% 20.8% 66.1% 53%
Japan USA 263 19.9% 19.9% 60.2% 40% 6.2% 15.2% 78.7% 73%
AVERAGES (12 data sets, 19.5% 42.4% 38.1% 20% 9.2% 18.0% 72.8% 64%
unweighted)
The implicit data reported in this table were obtained from IAT measures (see Part IV) in which pleas-
ant and unpleasant words were classified together with the items representing the groups shown in the
table. The explicit data listed in this table were obtained from self-report measures of endorsed atti-
tudes. The "index" column reports a bias index for each topic, computed as the percentage favoring the
advantaged group minus the percentage favoring the disadvantaged group. The higher the value of this
index, the more pervasive is the bias. The bias index's values for IAT measures revealed considerably
higher values than for the self-report measures, indicating that implicit bias is far more pervasive than
explicit bias. The race and age data from the IAT demonstration website are previously unpublished.
The data from the IAT research website were reported by Nosek, supra note 15.
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Table 2. Percentages Favoring European American (EA) Relative to African American (AA) on Self-
report (Explicit) and IAT (Implicit) Measures
Self-report (Explicit) [AT (Implicit)
Subcategories N Percent favoring Percent favoring
AA Fneither I EA I Index AA j neither EA Index
Education Level
thru high school 3869 9.9% 57.9% 32.2% 22% 9.8% 26.2% 64.0% 54%
grad
at least some college 13028 11.3% 54.1% 34.6% 23% 10.2% 23.2% 66.6% 56%
at least some grad 3829 12.5% 53.5% 34.0% 21% 12.4% 24.8% 62.9% 50%
school
Race and Ethnicity
Black (incl. multira- 2277 58.9% .36.2% 4.8% -54% 34.1% 33.6% 32.4% -2%
cial)
Hispanic (not Black) 1204 15.0% 59.7% 25.3% 10% 10.2% 29.2% 60.5% 50%
Asian & Pacific 1080 9.6% 57.5% 32.9% 23% 7.7% 24.8% 67.5% 60%
Islander
White 14805 3.4% 56.0% 40.7% 37% 6.8% 21.7% 71.5% 65%
Age
under 25 13823 9.7% 55.7% 34.5% 25% 9.4% 23.7% 66.9% 58%
25-44 5403 14.9% 53.9% 31.2% 16% 12.8% 24.4% 62.8% 50%
45 and older 1743 12.3% 47.1% 40.6% 28% 12.6% 25.6% 61.8% 49%
Sex
Female 13060 12.3% 57.8% 29.8% 17% 11.4% 25.2% 63.4% 52%





The finding of high levels of the bias index for all demographic subgroups other than Black (i.e., Afri-
can American) indicates the pervasiveness of pro-EA bias. Even though the bias index was lower in
groups of Hispanics and political liberals than in other groups, it was still quite high among those
groups.
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VII
WHY Is IMPLICIT BIAS So PERVASIVE?
This question can be divided into three parts: First, how are implicit
attitudes and stereotypes acquired? Second, what mental representations
underlie implicit attitudes and stereotypes? Third, do the representations
underlying implicit attitudes and stereotypes differ from those underlying
explicit attitudes and stereotypes? Answers to these questions could ex-
plain both the weak relations observed between IAT and explicit measures
and the substantially greater bias apparent in implicit attitudes than in ex-
plicit ones. It may be several years before thorough research-based answers
to these questions are available. These answers will require, in part, re-
search that examines the formation of implicit attitudes and stereotypes in
young children. To be used with preschool children, the IAT needs modifi-
cations, the most substantial of which is to replace printed-word stimulus
items either with pictures or with spoken words.33
In a recent review article, Rudman wrote, "The hypothesized causal
influences on attitudes include early (even preverbal) experiences, affective
experiences, cultural biases, and cognitive consistency principles. Each
may influence implicit attitudes more than explicit attitudes, underscoring
their conceptual distinction."34 Rudman's proposal that early experiences
and affective experiences may be reflected more in implicit attitudes than
in explicit attitudes may explain why implicit attitudes generally reveal
more bias, as Tables 1 and 2 show. As Rudman also noted, influences of
cultural factors on the IAT can also explain why people often display im-
plicit attitudes that appear more concordant with their general cultural mi-
lieu than with the experiences of their individual upbringing.35 As an
example, African Americans' implicit racial attitudes, rather than showing
strong ingroup favoritism, are (on average) remarkably close to indicating
racial neutrality.36 This can be seen in Table 2, which also shows that this
pattern for African Americans' implicit attitudes contrasts sharply with
their explicit racial attitudes, which are strongly polarized in the ingroup-
favorable (pro-AA) direction. This could indicate that African Americans'
implicit racial attitudes show an influence of the United States's pro-
European-American culture. There is no evidence of this influence on Af-
rican Americans' explicit attitude responses. The observation of approxi-
mate racial neutrality of African Americans' implicit attitudes is especially
33. Research with IAT procedures that have been adapted for use with preschool children is
being actively pursued in the laboratories of Mahzarin R. Banaji and Andrew L. Meltzoff.
34. Laurie A. Rudman, Sources of Implicit Attitudes, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
79, 79 (2004).
35. Id. at 80.
36. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for
Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. LAW REV. 1119, 1136 (2006) (discussing this and
related observations).
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impressive because it is a blatant exception to the general pattern of im-
plicit attitudes that reveal more bias than explicit attitudes.
If implicit attitude and stereotype measures are indicators of the so-
cial-cognitive content of one's broad cultural environment, then Table I's
data indicate that (for as-yet-unclear reasons) explicit measures of attitudes
and stereotypes do not reflect the social-cognitive content of the culture of
those who provide the measures. If true, this conclusion would certainly
provide a discouraging assessment of the value of explicit measures, and it
provides a perspective on one of the most reasonable and plausible cri-
tiques that has been offered of the IAT. The essence of this critique is that
IAT measures should be interpreted as indicating modal beliefs or attitudes
that respondents understand to be generally endorsed by others (that is,
cultural beliefs).37
The view that the IAT provides a measure of one's understanding of
cultural beliefs external to oneself implies that individual differences in
IAT measures are indictors merely of differences in the clarity with which
those external, cultural beliefs are perceived. If that were the case, then
IAT measures should have no more relation to interesting forms of social
behavior than would differences among people in the clarity of their other
perceptions, such as their perceptions of symbols on an eye chart. Contra-
dicting this expectation, however, meta-analytic evidence for the predictive
validity of IAT measures indicates that IAT measures successfully predict
a variety of types of social behavior.38 Failure to explain this predictive
validity of the IAT constitutes a notable weakness of the cultural-beliefs
interpretation of IAT measures.39
37. Olson and Fazio describe cultural beliefs as "extrapersonal associations." Michael A. Olson
& Russell H. Fazio, Reducing the Influence of Extrapersonal Associations on the Implicit Association
Test: Personalizing the IA T, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 653, 653 (2004). Karpinski and
Hilton call such beliefs "environmental association[s]." Andrew Karpinski & James L. Hilton, Attitudes
and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 774, 775 (2001). Arkes and
Tetlock refer to them as "[s]hared cultural knowledge." Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions
of Implicit Prejudice, or "'Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test? ", 15 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 257, 275 (2004).
38. See Poehlman et al., supra note 30; see also supra Part V.
39. Those who regard the IAT as reflecting cultural beliefs rather than implicit attitudes face an
additional challenge. Their views include these two propositions: (a) the IAT reflects cultural beliefs
and (b) the IAT assesses something different from what explicit measures assess. It follows logically
from these two propositions that (c) explicit measures do not measure cultural beliefs. Another belief
endorsed by many, including those who advocate the cultural-beliefs critique of the IAT, is
that (d) explicit measures assess views that respondents avow or endorse. Juxtaposing (c) and (d),
one arrives at the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that people's endorsed beliefs do not correspond to
cultural beliefs. It is genuinely puzzling to arrive at this conclusion. What might average values of
explicit measures assess other than the average levels of beliefs that are dominant in one's culture?
Proponents of the cultural-belief interpretation of the IAT have not yet addressed these paradoxical
implications of their interpretation.
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VIII
Do IMPLICIT BIASES PRODUCE DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR?
As Parts V and VII described, evidence that implicit attitudes produce
discriminatory behavior is already substantial4" and will continue to accu-
mulate. The dominant interpretation of this evidence is that implicit attitu-
dinal biases are especially important in influencing nondeliberate or
spontaneous discriminatory behaviors.
A study by McConnell and Leibold,4 which was one of the first ex-
perimental investigations to relate an IAT race attitude measure to dis-
criminatory behavior, provides a good illustration. In this study, the
behavior of White undergraduate students was videotaped while they were
being interviewed separately by White and Black experimenters.4 2 These
subjects also completed a race attitude IAT measure. Subjects whose Race
IAT scores indicated strong implicit preference for White relative to Black
hesitated less and made fewer speech errors when speaking to the White
experimenter than to the Black experimenter. They also spoke more to and
smiled more at the White experimenter than the Black experimenter. These
subtle and spontaneous behaviors suggested higher levels of comfort inter-
acting with the White experimenters.4 3
This result of the McConnell and Leibold experiment is especially
important in light of findings that were reported by Word, Zanna, and Coo-
per44 well before the IAT was developed. In the first of their two studies,
Word et al. showed that when interviewing both Black and White job ap-
plicants, White students showed greater indications of nonverbal discom-
fort and spent less time speaking with the Black applicants-two indicators
that McConnell and Leibold had found to be predicted by the Race IAT. In
40. See Poehlman et al., supra note 30.
41. See Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations among the Implicit Association Test,
Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 435 (2001).
42. Subjects did not know in advance about the videotaping, but they received a subsequent
description and explanation, at which time their signed consent to use the videotape as a source of
research data was requested.
43. Other published studies have likewise found correlations of IAT-measured racial associations
with indicators of subtle or spontaneous discriminatory actions. See Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Black
Americans' Implicit Racial Associations and Their Implications for Intergroup Judgment, 21 Soc.
COGNITION 61 (2003); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social
Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 342
(2004); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. 640 (2003); Jennifer A. Richeson et al., An jMRI
Investigation of the Impact of Interracial Contact on Executive Function, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
1323 (2003). Several similar unpublished results involving Race IAT measures were included in the
Poehlman et al. meta-analytic review, along with similar results from studies of implicit biases toward
other stigmatized groups, such as Germans' implicit attitudes toward Turks. See Poehlman et al., supra
note 30.
44. See Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974).
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Word et al.'s second study, White interviewers were carefully trained to
control these same subtle aspects of their behavior in their interactions with
White job applicants who were unaware of the interviewer's training.
White interviewees who encountered these trained interviewers performed
worse in the interview and were more uncomfortable and distant in their
interaction style. Such interviewees also judged their interviewer to be less
friendly. The combination of the McConnell and Word findings reveals
that implicit bias may affect interviews in ways that can disadvantage
Black job applicants.
Another noteworthy result is the finding that the Race IAT, when ad-
ministered to White American subjects, predicts activation of the amyg-
dala-a presumed indicator of fear or other negative emotional arousal-in
response to photographic images of unfamiliar African American faces.45 A
related finding was the report by Richeson et al. that IAT measures corre-
lated with evidence of self-regulatory or executive control activity on ex-
posure to African American faces.46
Ix
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ATTENUATE THE INFLUENCE
OF IMPLICIT BIASES ON BEHAVIOR?
In their 1995 review of then-available evidence, Greenwald and
Banaji suggested that attentional focus could attenuate automatic influ-
ences on social judgment, if those automatic influences were relatively
weak.4 7 Applying this principle, and assuming that implicit biases consti-
tute "weak automatic influences," one might expect that getting people to
think more about, or to attend more closely to, their objectives in an inter-
racial interaction might eliminate the effects of implicit bias. However,
Poehlman et al.'s review of the relevant predictive validity evidence for
IAT measures suggests a limitation of this conclusion.48 Although this re-
view found that the predictive validity of explicit measures was indeed
greater for more deliberative behavior, it also found that prediction of be-
havior by IAT measures was not reduced when the examined behavior was
more deliberative.
Consider the application of these findings to a hypothetical situation
in which racially different applicants are being evaluated for jobs, educa-
tional program admissions, loans, or medical treatments. If an interviewer
in these situations devotes more deliberate effort to evaluating the candi-
dates on explicit performance criteria, the interviewer may make better
45. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts
Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000).
46. See Richeson et al., supra note 43.
47. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 5, at 17.
48. See Poehlman et al., supra note 30.
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decisions overall but may still demonstrate the effects of implicit bias.
Thus, Poehlman et al.'s conclusions suggest caution in assuming that im-
plicit bias can be reduced merely by increased deliberative effort on a deci-
sion. Because no studies have yet directly tested this hypothesis, the
question of how to attenuate the impact of implicit biases on subtle but im-
portant aspects of interpersonal interaction still awaits an answer.
X
How CAN IMPLICIT BIASES BE ALTERED?
In the first few years after the development of the IAT, many re-
searchers working with the test were impressed that, when they repeatedly
administered the same IAT to themselves, their measures of implicit bias
remained remarkably similar over time. This was in part a welcome obser-
vation, because it indicated that IAT measures might be identically admin-
istered on multiple occasions to the same person without losing their
validity as research measures (in contrast with, for instance, intelligence
tests). The consistency of IAT measures over time also suggested the sta-
bility of implicit attitudes and stereotypes measured by the IAT.
Subsequent research, however, has shown that conclusion to be pre-
mature, as one of the first experiments that sought to influence IAT per-
formance illustrates. Starting with the assumption that media exposures
may influence the race-valence associations measured by the IAT, Das-
gupta and Greenwald asked White and Asian-American undergraduate stu-
dents to complete a preliminary task in which they identified a series of
photographs of well-known and admired African Americans (scientists,
artists, political leaders), mixed with photographs of somewhat less well-
known but thoroughly disreputable European Americans (terrorists and
serial murderers).49 A subsequent Race IAT measure revealed that this pho-
tograph-identification task reduced the level of automatic preference for
European American (relative to African American). This reduction in im-
plicit bias persisted over a twenty-four hour delay.5"
Blair summarized a number of similar studies and concluded that im-
plicit biases are malleable." For example, implicit gender stereotypes of
feminine weakness were reduced by imagining examples of
49. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALUTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800 (2001).
50. The opposite type of preliminary exposure, consisting of photographs of admirable European
Americans and disreputable African Americans, had no noticeable impact on Race IAT scores. See id.
at 803-04. This observation suggested that the ordinary media environment encountered by the study's
undergraduate research subjects might have been functioning as the equivalent of these biased (anti-
Black) exposures. See id. at 805; cf. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1490
(2005).
51. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALTY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002).
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counter-stereotypic (i.e., strong) women," and implicit anti-Black race atti-
tudes were reduced by having African American experimenters administer
the research procedure. 3
In studies using the Race IAT, these effects are typically modest, tak-
ing the form of reduction, but not elimination, of implicit biases. Although
the necessary research has not yet been done, caution is warranted in
speculating that repeated interventions of the types demonstrated to be ef-
fective in these experiments will have enduring effects on levels of implicit
bias. Some suggest that interventions like those used in the malleability
studies temporarily activate a subtype of a larger category, such that this
subtype temporarily replaces the larger category. For example, in the
Dasgupta and Greenwald experiment, 4 the preliminary exposure to admi-
rable Blacks may have activated the relatively attractive subtype of African
American celebrities. Once activated, this subcategory would temporarily
function as a mental replacement for the larger (and presumably more
negatively valenced) African American category. If this interpretation is
correct, it seems unlikely that even repeated interventions will produce
cumulative effects in a larger societal environment that reinforces preexist-
ing racial attitudes and stereotypes.
This skeptical appraisal does not imply that long-term changes in im-
plicit biases are impossible. For example, research has shown that when a
person forms a new personal connection with a member of a previously
devalued outgroup, implicit attitudes toward that group may change dra-
matically and rapidly.5 For example, when a son or daughter marries a
member of a racial or ethnic minority or when a close friend is paralyzed in
an accident and begins using a wheelchair, a favorable implicit attitude
may rapidly replace a pre-existing negative implicit bias. 6
52. See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes
Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828 (2001).
53. See Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001).
54. See Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 50.
55. Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps recently reported that an implicit indicator of expected anti-
outgroup racial bias was absent for college student subjects who had interracial dating experience. See
Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 Sci. 785
(2005).
George Orwell gave a remarkable, albeit fictional, model for this type of influence in a scene from
Nineteen Eighty-Four. After 20 minutes of haranguing a crowd of Oceanians with vilification of the
Eurasian enemy, the orator receives a piece of paper and "without pausing in his speech" continues his
tirade against the (new) enemy, Eastasia:
Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. Oceania was at war
with Eastasia! ... The banners and posters with which the square was decorated were all
wrong! . . . There was a riotous interlude while posters were ripped from the walls, banners
torn to shreds and trampled underfoot.... But within two or three minutes it was all
over.... The Hate continued exactly as before, except that the target had been changed.
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FoUR 180-82 (1949).
56. See Greenwald et al., supra note 5.
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Another way in which malleability of implicit bias has been tested
with IAT measures has been to ask research subjects to try to respond to
the IAT so as to produce a specific result-for example, asking subjects
who ordinarily show implicit preference for European American to attempt
to produce a Race IAT result showing preference for African American.
Relatively few subjects succeed at this faking assignment, partly because
few can spontaneously come up with a faking strategy. 57 Although some
success in faking has been produced by instructing subjects to deliberately
respond slowly on the IAT component task for which they can ordinarily
respond rapidly, it remains apparent that the IAT is far more resistant to
faking than are explicit (self-report) measures that are designed to assess
attitudes or stereotypes.i
XI
Is IMPLICIT BIAS A PROBABLE CAUSE OF DISPARATE OUTCOMES?
[W]hen you have eliminated all which is impossible, then what-
ever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
-Sherlock Holmes
59
The argument that implicit bias is a probable cause of race discrimina-
tion sometimes requires inference by a process of elimination. This is a
reasoning device endorsed not only by Sherlock Holmes, but also by the
Supreme Court. Specifically, in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,6" a
1978 employment discrimination case, the Court wrote:
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do
not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons .... Thus, when all legitimate reasons for [a negative
outcome] have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we
57. See Rainer Banse et al., Implicit Attitudes Towards Homosexuality: Reliability, Validity, and
Controllability of the JAT, in 48 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR EXPERIMENTELLE PSYCHOLOGIE 145 (2001); Boris
Egloff & Stefan C. Schmukle, Predictive Validity of an Implicit Association Test for Assessing Anxiety,
83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1441 (2002); Melanie C. Steffens, Is the Implicit Association Test
Immune to Faking?, 51 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 165 (2004).
58. Cf Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IA T), 66 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 83 (2003). Researchers may be able to detect such faking by noting when a subject is
responding unusually slowly in a task. See id. at 93. By comparison, it is harder for researchers to
detect faking on self-report measures; faking attitudes and beliefs on self-report measures typically
requires no more than modifying the position on which a pencil mark is placed in responding to a
survey questionnaire.
59. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN OF FOUR (1890), reprinted in SHERLOCK
HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES 87, 111 (1930) (emphasis removed).
60. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration such as race.61
Whether adjudicating an individual allegation of discrimination or attempt-
ing to understand broad patterns of disadvantage in society, if one finds
evidence of disparate impact-for example, in the form of systematically
disadvantageous outcomes to African Americans in health care, education,
employment, housing, or criminal justice-one may begin to identify and
eliminate possible causes. Conceivable explanations that cannot be elimi-
nated remain worth considering.
For sake of argument, let us assume that in attempting to understand
whether implicit race bias has played a role in probation recommendations
in a particular criminal court system, a researcher has eliminated all con-
ceivable non-race-related ("racially neutral") explanations on the basis of
sound research evidence. Let us also assume that none of the relevant deci-
sionmakers has reported consciously holding negative racial attitudes or
stereotypes. Finally, let us assume that no test of implicit bias has been
administered to these decision makers. With this set of assumptions, is it
reasonable to infer that the observed racial disparity is being caused, at
least in part, by implicit bias? Not only is it reasonable, it should be re-
garded as highly probable. This conclusion is justified by three considera-
tions.
The first consideration is the observed pervasiveness of implicit bias,
as was clearly demonstrated by the data summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The
second consideration comes from the available evidence that (1) implicit
biases are predictive of discriminatory behavior and (2) implicit-bias
measures do a significantly better job than explicit-bias measures in pre-
dicting behavioral indicators of discrimination.62 The third consideration is
provided by findings that implicit bias plays a causal role in discrimination.
The most important piece of this evidence at present is the finding that sub-
tle discriminatory behaviors, of the types known to be predicted by IAT
measures of implicit race bias, play a significant role in determining the
outcomes of job interviews.63 The absence of another type of evidence also
supports this causal interpretation. Specifically, if-in the absence of both
racially neutral causes and explicit bias-racially disparate impact could be
shown to occur when implicit bias is shown to be absent, this would pro-
vide evidence against a causal role of implicit bias in disparate impact. No
such evidence now exists.
In summary, a substantial and actively accumulating body of research
evidence establishes that implicit race bias is pervasive and is associated
with discrimination against African Americans. Consequently, when
61. Id. at 577.
62. See supra Parts IV and IX.
63. See McConnell & Leibold, supra note 41; Word, supra note 44, at 111-12.
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racially neutral causes and explicit bias can be rejected as causal explana-
tions for racially disparate outcomes, implicit race bias must be regarded as
a probable, even if not definitively established, cause. More direct confir-
mations of the causal role of implicit bias may emerge in the next few
years, as researchers increasingly include measures of implicit bias in their
studies of relevant domains in which racially disparate impact is a known
phenomenon.
